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Freeman, 1983). However, Evelyn Fox Keller is not aAn Egg Is an Egg Is an Egg
typical historian of biology, either. Her recent books,
even though they draw heavily on historical evidence,
are not histories in the strict sense. Keller is highly selec-Making Sense of Life: Explaining Biological Development
tive in her choice of material and she does not writewith Models, Metaphors, and Machines
extensively documented monographs on a topic.By Evelyn Fox Keller
Rather, her style is essayistic with all the advantagesCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (2002).
and disadvantages of this particular genre. The essay388 pp. $20.97
format, often and unjustly maligned in science, suits
On a recent long flight from Vienna to Phoenix, returning Keller well in her pursuits, such as trying to understand
from a conference on the legacy of the famed Prater how scientific explanations are constructed, communi-
Vivarium and the Viennese Roots of Theoretical Biology, cated, and finally accepted, as well as in her attempts
I had plenty of time to ponder Evelyn Fox Keller’s most to identify the generative role of language and meta-
recent book Making Sense of Life and its topic, what it phors in that process. Once she identifies a particular
means to “understand” in developmental biology. After thread, such as the notion of the gene, she then follows
three days of discussions focusing on the close connec- it through different layers of meaning and signification.
tions between experimental and theoretical biology dur- The result is always stimulating, even though it often
ing the first decades of the 20th century, a phenomenon leaves the reader yearning for a more systematic and
that was especially prominent in the context of develop- comprehensive treatment of the subject.
mental biology, I was, at first, struck by the many omis- At the heart of all of Keller’s studies lies the fundamen-
sions in Evelyn Fox Keller’s work. It is indeed “idiosyn- tal epistemological question of what constitutes an ex-
cratic“ (p. xi), as the author claims in her Preface. I will planation in biology. While this is intrinsically a philo-
discuss some of the problems I had with this book be- sophical question, it is also a historical one. It is obvious
low, but first, by means of introduction I would like to to everybody, and not just to students of the history of
situate Evelyn Fox Keller’s work within recent discus- biology, that the evaluation criteria for scientific explana-
sions in the history and philosophy of biology as well tions have changed through time. And it is equally true
as within theoretical biology. that different scientific disciplines employ their own set
Over the last decade, Evelyn Fox Keller has published of standards when considering the results different ex-
a series of books devoted to the conceptual analysis periments or models. This plurality of acceptable expla-
of some of the major themes of 20th century biology nations is what concerns Evelyn Fox Keller in her recent
(Refiguring Life: Metaphors of Twentieth-Century Biol- work. Keller presents us with several different examples
ogy, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995; The and standards of what has, at one point or another,
Century of the Gene, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University counted as a legitimate attempt to explain development.
Press, 2000; and finally Making Sense of Life). The com- Focusing mainly on theoretical approaches (see below),
mon theme behind all these works is a focus on the Keller finally arrives at the philosophically challenging
explanatory as well as the heuristic role of metaphors question whether the category “Life” is a natural or a
and models in the scientific process. Starting with the human kind. She concludes that it is the latter, given
recognition that scientists act within communities that any answer to this question depends on historically
bound together by shared problems, practices, technol- contingent categories.
ogies, and languages, Keller has provided us with stimu- Making Sense of Life is divided into three parts. Part
lating analyses of several important concepts and devel- One focuses on models, which in Keller’s use of the
opments in 20th century biology, such as the gene and term refers to attempts to “explain the emergence of
the importance of the machine metaphor in theoretical biological form through the use of physical and mathe-
and molecular biology. She has consistently been part matical models“ (p. 6) prior to 1953. Here she discusses
of the avant garde within the small but vibrant commu- the largely unknown work of Ste´phane Leduc, who at
nity of historians and philosophers of biology, champi- the turn of the 20th century tried to understand the diver-
oning many of the recently successful trends in the histo- sity of life’s forms in terms of the properties of chemical
riography of biology. She was among the first to focus processes such as osmosis. In this section Keller also
on the role of gender in science (Reflections on Gender introduces the work of D’Arcy Thompson On Growth
and Science, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, and Form as well as Rashevsky’s and Turing’s attempts
1985) and has also helped to establish the recent em- to establish mathematical biology. Part Two focuses on
phasis on the technical as well as metaphorical dimen- metaphors and mathematical models in the context of
sions of scientific language. Furthermore, she has al- molecular biology, especially those that tried to explain
ways been somebody who took the technical aspects developmental process. Ideas such as “gene action”
of science seriously, thus avoiding many of the pitfalls and “genetic program” are discussed together with
of the recent “science wars.” models of pattern formation, gene regulation, and posi-
Making Sense of Life is in many ways the culmination tional information. This section of Making Sense of Life
of Evelyn Fox Keller’s own unorthodox career that began is also an epistemological reflection on some recent
with training in theoretical physics followed by work in histories of molecular biology, such as Lily Kay’s history
mathematical biology (on problems of pattern formation of the genetic code (Kay, Who Wrote the Book of Life:
and determination in slime mold aggregates), and sub- A History of the Genetic Code, Stanford, CA: Stanford
sequently led her to become a historian and philosopher University Press, 2000) or Michel Morange’s history of
of biology as well as the first biographer of Noble Laure- molecular biology (Morange, A History of Molecular Biol-
ate Barbara McClintock (A Feeling for the Organism: ogy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).
Part Three, entitled “Machines,” discusses the episte-The Life and Work of Barbara McClintock, New York:
Book Reviews
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mological challenges provided by new technologies, study of development, evolution, and regeneration in a
variety of animal and plant species. The declared goalsuch as molecular imaging, computer simulations of
regulatory networks, and artificial life. of its founder Hans Przibram was to arrive at “generaliza-
tions” that would unite several detailed empirical studiesI have mentioned before that Keller is not a typical
historian of biology and by her own admission she does (Przibram, Experimentalzoologie vol. 1–7, Wien: Deu-
ticke, 1907–1929). Przibram also contributed to mathe-not write comprehensive historical treatments. Yet, in
the case of Making Sense of Life, the particular arrange- matical biology (Przibram, Aufbau mathematischer Bio-
logie, Berlin: Borntraeger, 1923) and, as the mentor ofment of chapters and themes and the implicit linear time
frame does suggest a certain developmental perspec- both Paul Weiss and Ludwig von Bertalanffy, his influ-
ence continued well into the second half of the 20thtive on its own. Therefore, the selection of topics is more
of an issue in this work than it has been in Keller’s century. Examples such as the Prater Vivarium make
Keller’s experience of the total separation between theother writings. Keller carefully selected her examples as
illustrations for her main themes; the role and meaning cultures of experimental and mathematical biologists
less of an inevitable epistemological divide. Such exam-of models, metaphors, and machines in explanations of
development and the changing standards for explana- ples might also lead to a different answer with regard
to Keller’s question whether “Life” is a natural or a hu-tion and “understanding” in the recent history of devel-
opmental biology. Following a standard practice of de- man kind. The continuity of the experimental tradition
in developmental biology, especially when compared tovelopmental biologists, Keller chose several “outliers,”
hoping that the unusual cases reveal more about the the more contingent history of mathematical models,
certainly represents a challenge to philosophical inter-epistemological conditions than the mainstream or “nor-
mal” cases. While I am sympathetic to this approach—I pretations that concentrate largely on linguistic systems
(see Rheinberger, Towards a History of Epistemicdo think that we can learn as much if not more about
science from its failures than from its successes—I also Things: Synthesizing Proteins in the Test Tube, Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 1997). It does not, how-believe that such an approach only makes sense when
it is embedded within a reasonably detailed account of ever, diminish the importance of detailed historical anal-
ysis of these developments.the historical development of the discipline at large,
much the same way as gene knockouts or tissue trans- In conclusion, Making Sense of Life is a stimulating
and irritating book. It is stimulating with regard to theplantations need to be interpreted within the framework
of a theory of “normal” development. questions it raises about what constitutes an adequate
explanation in developmental biology and how we canTherefore, I find the many omissions of the (success-
ful) history of attempts to understand the development reconcile different explanatory paradigms. It is irritating
with regard to what it leaves out (much of the importantof the embryo in Making Sense of Life rather problem-
atic. Keller provides us with insights into the work of work in developmental biology of the 20th century) and
what it suggests (a very narrow and restrictive definitionLeduc, D’Arcy Thompson, Rashevsky, and Turing; dis-
cusses the theoretical work related to genetic informa- of theoretical biology as mathematical biology and a
rather unconvincing challenge to the possibility of ustion, regulation, and positional information; and intro-
duces recent developments in visualization, computer reaching an understanding of development due to the
enormous complexities of life). Yet Keller’s essays aresimulation, and artificial life. However, without any or
very little reference to the work of Roux, Driesch, Wilson, an important and much needed and appreciated contri-
Loeb, Goldschmidt, Spemann, Needham, Przibram, bution to our current discourse in developmental biol-
Ku¨hn, and Waddington as well as the more recent contri- ogy. Reading Making Sense of Life and arguing with
butions of Gierer, Gehring, Hadorn, Lewis, Wieschaus, Keller (in effigy or in person) is indeed thought provoking,
and Nu¨sslein Volhard, etc., Keller’s analysis suggests a inspiring, and rewarding.
rather one-sided picture of what “understanding” meant
in 20th century developmental biology.
Manfred D. LaubichlerAnother point of critique is Keller’s implicit equation
Department of Biologyof theoretical biology with mathematical biology. With
Arizona State Universitythe exception of Leduc’s osmotic models and his vision
Tempe, Arizona 85287of a synthetic biology, Keller introduces only specifically
mathematical approaches to development and investi-
gates their epistemological status and historical fate.
About the Description and the OriginThis bias owes a lot to Keller’s own acculturation within
mathematical biology; however, it also leaves out a of Biological Differences
whole discourse of theoretical biology that was not spe-
cifically mathematical and that contributed a lot to ex-
planations of development. Conceptual questions of the Biochemical Adaptation: Mechanism and Process
kind that Keller addresses in her book have been part in Physiological Evolution
of a more inclusive discourse of theoretical biology dur- By Peter W. Hochachka and George N. Somero
ing the first decades of the 20th century. Interestingly Oxford: Oxford University Press (2002).
enough, this discourse of theoretical biology was also 544 pp. $40.00
closely linked with empirical studies. One of the centers
About 3.8 billion years ago, the primitive earth was com-of this earlier version of theoretical biology was the
posed of unusual environments from which cell proto-Prater Vivarium, Vienna’s privately owned Institute for
Experimental Biology, devoted to the experimental types, somewhat similar to certain modern prokaryotic
